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ISAAC D. BUCK† 
As it approaches its tenth birthday, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is devolving. 
Intended to solve problems that had vexed American health care for generations, the ACA built a 
comprehensive structure by providing more Americans with accessible health insurance, reordering 
the private insurance market, expanding and reconfiguring Medicaid, and installing rational 
incentives into America’s health care enterprise. Without question, it was the most important piece of 
health care legislation since the mid-1960s, and it brought about positive change for millions of 
Americans. 
However, over its short lifespan, the ACA has faced persistent practical, popular, and policy-based 
challenges. It remains politically tenuous, with the law’s imperfections fueling an uninterrupted 
barrage of legal, administrative, and regulatory attacks, which, piece by piece, have weakened its 
overall effectiveness. Instead of installing a comprehensive system, the ACA opted to protect American 
patients and beneficiaries from the market’s worst effects without any effective means for cost control. 
Its failure to address the cost of health care has continued to haunt it, making it unclear whether it 
will fully collapse or whether a mutated version will lumber into the future. Either would be 
devastating to the future of American health care. This cost challenge is vividly illustrated by the acute 
pain experienced by those who receive insurance through its newly constructed exchanges, where 
millions of Americans face rising premiums and deductibles.  
Using lessons from behavioral economics, this Article suggests a reimagining and reordering of the 
private ACA marketplace in an effort to put it on a more stable financial footing. Tools from the field 
of behavioral economics—relied upon in the federal Medicare program, public health laws, and 
employee wellness plans—could be deployed to the ACA marketplaces by creating smarter subsidies 
that financially reward the most cost-conscious insurance companies. This would sharpen the 
incentive for insurance companies to seek increasing discounts, lowering the price of care. And no 
matter the future of the ACA, insights posited here must be part of any future reform effort to address 
the cost of American health care—an indispensable, but consistently neglected policy goal. 
                                                        
 †  Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law; Juris Doctor, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School; Master of Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania; Bachelor of Arts, Miami University 
(Ohio). Special thanks are owed to I. Glenn Cohen, Mark Hall, David Wolitz, Michael Higdon, and Teri Baxter 
for their insights and suggestions, and to the participants and attendees of the Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, 
and Bioethics Fall Workshop in September of 2018 at Harvard Law School. Any errors or omissions are my 
own. 
262 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:261 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 263 
I.      AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE HANG-UPS .................................................. 268 
A. THE ACA AS AN ENDURING SPLIT DECISION .............................. 271 
1. The Undeniable Accomplishment of Access .......................... 273 
2. Cost Expenditure Growth ...................................................... 277 
B. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT .............................................................. 282 
II.     THE MARKET’S STRUCTURAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ........................ 286 
A. COOPERATIVE CORPORATISM ...................................................... 287 
B. SYMBIOTIC PRICING ..................................................................... 288 
C. POLITICAL AND REGULATORY DEGRADATION ............................ 292 
III.    TEN YEARS OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS ............................................. 293 
A. MODERN POLICY “NUDGES” IN HEALTH LAW ............................ 294 
1. Consumers and Employees: Soft Efforts ............................... 295 
2. Organizations and Physicians: Value Payments ................... 298 
IV.     COST-CONSCIOUS MARKET ARCHITECTURE ........................................ 300 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 305 
  
February 2020] AFFORDING OBAMACARE 263 
INTRODUCTION 
More than eight years after its passage—on December 14, 2018—U.S. 
District Court Judge Reed O’Connor declared the entire Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) unconstitutional.1 Legal experts called the decision 
an “exercise of raw judicial activism,”2 and “not how judges are supposed to 
act.”3 For their part, conservative columnists called it “an assault on the rule of 
law,”4 “deplorable,”5 and deserving of reversal.6 No matter its legal 
defensibility—which, going into 2020 seems debatable at best, even after a Fifth 
Circuit opinion7—Judge O’Connor’s opinion thrusts the ACA into yet another 
disruptive and confusing period of uncertainty.8  
Texas v. United States is the newest in a long line of judicial, legislative, 
administrative, and political threats that have faced the ACA since its creation.9 
There was National Federation of Independent. Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) in 
                                                        
 1. Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 619 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
 2. Nicholas Bagley, The Latest ACA Ruling Is Raw Judicial Activism and Impossible to Defend, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/15/latest-aca-ruling-is-raw-judicial-
activism-impossible-defend/?utm_term=.f78cef28f396 (“The logic of the ruling is as difficult to follow as it is 
to defend, and it sets the stage for yet another round of high-stakes constitutional litigation over the future of 
health care in the United States.”). 
 3. Jonathan H. Adler and Abbe R. Gluck, What the Lawless Obamacare Ruling Means, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/opinion/obamacare-ruling-unconstitutional-affordable-care-
act.html. 
 4. Philip Klein, I Hate Obamacare, but Texas Judge’s Decision on Its Unconstitutionality Is an Assault 
on the Rule of Law, WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 17, 2018, 11:46 AM), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/i-hate-obamacare-but-texas-judges-decision-on-its-
unconstitutionality-is-an-assault-on-the-rule-of-law. 
 5. See Obamacare Needs an Out-of-Court Settlement, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 17, 2018, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/12/obamacare-republicans-cant-rely-on-courts-on-health-care/. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Vann R. Newkirk II, What Happens to Obamacare Now, ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/12/obamacare-remains-despite-judges-ruling-texas/578356/ 
(“[the] decision rests on three fundamentally controversial and perhaps tenuous interpretations of the law that 
may be rejected.”); Will the Supreme Court Save Obamacare Again?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/opinion/trump-obamacare-supreme-court.html?action=click&module 
=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage. The Fifth Circuit issued its opinion on December 18, 2019, striking down the 
individual mandate, but returning the case to Judge O’Connor to examine severability. See Abby Goodnough, 
Obamacare Insurance Mandate Is Struck Down by Federal Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/health/obamacare-mandate.html. 
 8. See Jenny Deam, ACA Still Law of the Land but Consumers Confused and Worried After Judge’s 
Ruling, HOUS. CHRON, https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/ACA-still-law-
of-the-land-but-consumers-confused-13469518.php (last updated Apr. 2, 2019, 1:02 PM); Tucker Higgins and 
Berkeley Lovelace Jr., States Demand Clarity on Obamacare Ruling Before Friday to Avoid “Chaos,” and Cite 
Potential Government Shutdown, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/18/states-demand-clarity-on-
obamacare-ruling-before-friday-to-avoid-chaos.html (last updated Dec. 18, 2018, 1:37 PM). 
 9. See Katie Keith, Judge Hears Oral Arguments in Texas v. United States, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 
10, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180910.861789/full/. 
264 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:261 
2012,10 King v. Burwell in 2015,11 the American Health Care Act of 2017,12 and 
as many as seventy other total attempts by Congressional Republicans to “repeal, 
modify[,] or otherwise curb” it.13 These attempts include, of course, the most 
serious legislative threat in the summer of 2017, neutralized only by an emphatic 
thumbs-down from ailing Senator John McCain in the middle of the night.14 The 
unlikely identities of the law’s rescuers—Chief Justice John Roberts and Senator 
McCain—have only added to its broader existential drama.15 
And this is not just a story about resistance; some of the punches have 
landed.16 There was, most consequentially, the repeal of the individual mandate 
penalty in late 2017.17 There have been administrative changes—approaching 
                                                        
 10. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (NFIB). While upholding the individual 
mandate as a tax, NFIB made the Medicaid expansion provisions in the ACA voluntary. Id. at 569, 646. 
 11. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). In King, the Supreme Court upheld the ACA against an attack 
based on statutory analysis, upholding the universal availability of tax credits to all markets. Id. at 2495–96. 
 12. H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted). The American Health Care Act sought to peel back 
protections in the ACA and cut Medicaid funding. See id. 
 13. See Chris Riotta, GOP Aims to Kill Obamacare Yet Again After Failing 70 Times, NEWSWEEK (July 
29, 2017, 6:53 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/gop-health-care-bill-repeal-and-replace-70-failed-attempts-
643832. 
 14. See Jordan Weissmann, John McCain’s Complicated, Inscrutable Legacy on Obamacare, SLATE (Aug. 
26, 2018, 8:05 PM), https://slate.com/business/2018/08/john-mccains-health-care-legacy-did-he-really-save-
obamacare.html (“McCain . . . helped rescue the Affordable Care Act twice during 2017.”); see also Lauren Fox, 
John McCain’s Maverick Moment, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/28/politics/john-mccain-maverick-
health-care/index.html (last updated July 28, 2017, 3:45 PM); Carl Hulse, McCain Provides a Dramatic Finale 
on Health Care: Thumb Down, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/us/john-
mccains-real-return.html. 
 15. See Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2507 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We should start calling this law 
SCOTUScare.”). 
 16. For example, elimination of the individual mandate will cost the system—and American beneficiaries 
within that system—more, as admitted by the former Health and Human Services Secretary Tom Price, one of 
the acerbic critics of the ACA, in a jaw-dropping statement in the spring of 2018. See Audrey Carlsen & Haeyoun 
Park, The Same Agency That Runs Obamacare Is Using Taxpayer Money to Undermine It, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/04/us/hhs-anti-obamacare-campaign.html (“Since being 
sworn in as health secretary on February 10, Tom Price has posted on Twitter 48 infographics advocating against 
Obamacare, all of which bear the health department’s logo. . . . Once, Mr. Price tweeted five infographics in a 
single day.”); Eliza Collins, Former HHS Sec. Price: Repealing the Individual Mandate “Will Harm” People 
Insured Through Obamacare, USA TODAY (May 1, 2018, 11:21 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2018/05/01/former-hhs-sec-price-repealing-
individual-mandate-harm/568281002/ (“‘There are many, and I’m one of them, who believes . . . you’ll likely 
have individuals who are younger and healthier not participating in that market, and consequently, that drives 
up the cost for other folks within that market,’ Price said during the World Health Care Congress in Washington, 
D.C., according to The Washington Times.”); Margaret Hartmann, Trump Shows Commitment to Destroying 
Obamacare by Picking Tom Price for HHS, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 29, 2016), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/11/trump-tom-price-obamacare-hhs.html (“In a speech at CPAC 
shortly before the ACA was signed into law, Price said conservatives needed to ‘take our country back’ from ‘a 
vile liberal agenda that is threatening everything we hold dear as Americans.’”). 
 17. See Robert Pear et al., Trump to Scrap Critical Health Care Subsidies, Hitting Obamacare Again, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/politics/trump-obamacare-executive-order-
health-insurance.html?_r=0 (“Without the subsidies, insurance markets could quickly unravel.”); Margot 
Sanger-Katz, Requiem for the Individual Mandate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/upshot/individual-health-insurance-mandate-end-impact.html. 
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what can be called a “synthetic repeal,”18 which include a shortening of the open 
enrollment period,19 a cutting of funding for navigators,20 and the ending of cost-
sharing reduction (CSR) payments.21 There have also been other softer-but-
potent hostilities to the law—including the public relations assault from the 
nation’s chief executive.22 His comments have led to a majority of Americans 
holding the belief that the law’s marketplaces are, in fact, collapsing.23 By early 
2019, other threats waited like coiled springs.24  
But, as these hazards have mounted, a resilient optimism has enveloped the 
ACA.25 The ACA is reportedly stabilizing.26 For the first time in its tepid 
history,27 public approval of the law has exceeded disapproval for more than one 
                                                        
 18. Michael Hiltzik, Trump Plots Another Backdoor Effort to Gut Obamacare’s Consumer Protections, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017, 10:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-trump-associations-
obamacare-20171009-story.html. 
 19. See Philip Bump, Here’s How the Trump Administration Is Hurting Enrollment in Obamacare, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/09/28/heres-how-the-trump-
administration-is-hurting-enrollment-in-obamacare/. 
 20. See Ken Alltucker, Trump Administration Slashes Funding for Obamacare Outreach Program, USA 
TODAY (July 10, 2018, 9:33 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/07/10/obamacare-cuts-
mean-groups-have-less-sign-up-customers/773728002/. 
 21. The decision by the Trump administration to end the CSR payments will save the federal government 
$10 billion, but will cost it an additional $12.3 billion in increased premium-assistance tax credits in 2018. See 
Rabah Kamal et al., How the Loss of Cost-Sharing Subsidy Payments Is Affecting 2018 Premiums, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/how-the-loss-of-cost-sharing-subsidy-
payments-is-affecting-2018-premiums/; Larry Levitt et al., The Effects of Ending the Affordable Care Act’s 
Cost-Sharing Reduction Payments, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.kff.org/health-
reform/issue-brief/the-effects-of-ending-the-affordable-care-acts-cost-sharing-reduction-payments/. 
 22. See Thomas Kaplan, “Let Obamacare Fail,” Trump Says as G.O.P. Health Bill Collapses, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/us/politics/republicans-obamacare-repeal-now-replace-
later.html (noting that President “declared that his plan was now to ‘let Obamacare fail.’”). 
 23. See Rachel Bluth, Americans Have Mixed Feelings About the ACA’s Future—But Like Their Plans, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 3, 2018), https://khn.org/news/americans-have-mixed-feelings-about-the-acas-
future-but-like-their-plans/ (“[O]nly about one-fifth of people who obtain coverage on the individual market 
were even aware that the mandate penalty had been repealed as of 2019, according to the poll.”). 
 24. See Amy Goldstein, New Insurance Guidelines Would Undermine Rules of the Affordable Care Act, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/new-insurance-
guidelines-would-undermine-rules-of-the-affordable-care-act/2018/11/29/ff467f46-f357-11e8-aeea-
b85fd44449f5_story.html?utm_term=.c35db2a36328 (noting that under a new proposal, “states should be free 
to redefine the use of those [premium-assistance tax credit] subsidies” and “could allow the subsidies to be used 
for health plans the administration has been promoting outside the ACA marketplaces.”). 
 25. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2018). 
 26. Sarah Jones, Obamacare Is Still Going Strong, Despite Trump’s Sabotage Campaign, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 
28, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/obamacare-is-still-going-strong-despite-trumps-sabotage. 
html. 
 27. Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: The Public’s Views on the ACA, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2019), 
https://www.kff.org/interactive/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-the-publics-views-on-the-
aca/#?response=Favorable—Unfavorable&aRange=all (showing support for the ACA exceeding 50% for the 
first time in June of 2017). 
266 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:261 
year,28 reaching record-high approval in the mid-fifties in early 2018.29 Medicaid 
expansion has reached thirty-six states and Washington D.C.30 Ezekiel Emanuel 
says that the ACA’s exchanges are “thriving,”31 and Sarah Kliff notes that they 
“are having a surprisingly good year.”32 This optimism is reflected at the ballot-
box: indeed, the ACA was a winning political issue in the U.S. midterm elections 
in 2018.33 And, in the midst of a chaotic attack on its internal gears, federal-
based ACA signups slid only four percent during the most recent open 
enrollment period—sinking slightly from 8.8 million in 2018, to 8.5 million in 
2019.34 
While the battle between demise and survival may make for captivating 
media narratives, the story of the ACA in 2019 is nuanced. The political 
spectacle has obscured the law’s internal weaknesses that put its long-term 
sustainability at risk. Nowhere are the ACA’s weaknesses more destructive than 
in its so-called marketplaces, the platforms where Americans purchase health 
insurance, and where the law is locked in a permanent state of instability due to 
a stilted policy design. 35 As a result, the ACA has become unaffordable. 
On that marketplace, the ACA’s priority—of expanding access to health 
insurance—is made possible by a mix of government payments and government 
penalties, private ingenuity and state-based regulation. In simplest terms, under 
the ACA, the federal government has been working to constantly shield 
Americans from the true cost of their health care, but its financial protection has 
not proven universal, and certainly not infinitely durable. As a result, too many 
                                                        
 28. See Jim Norman, Affordable Care Act Gains Majority Approval for First Time, GALLUP (Apr. 4, 2017), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/207671/affordable-care-act-gains-majority-approval-first-time.aspx?g_ 
source=link_newsv9&g_campaign=item_222734&g_medium=copy. 
 29. Id. (according to Gallup, approval bounced between 37% and 48% between early 2013 and late 2016; 
in April 2017, 55% supported the law); see also Alice Ollstein, Public Approval of Obamacare Hits Record 
High Ahead of 2018 Midterms, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Mar. 1, 2018), 
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/public-approval-of-obamacare-hits-record-high-ahead-of-2018-midterms. 
 30. See David K. Jones, The Medicaid Wave, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20181108.484046/full/. 
 31. Ezekiel Emanuel, The Big Secret About the Affordable Care Act: It’s Working Just Fine, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-big-secret-about-the-affordable-care-act-its-
working-just-fine/2018/10/31/068da248-dd41-11e8-85df-7a6b4d25cfbb_story.html?utm_term= 
.893b303bafb5. 
 32. Sarah Kliff, Obamacare Is Having a Surprisingly Good Year, VOX (Nov. 26, 2018, 4:35 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/26/18113313/obamacare-mandate-tax. 
 33. See Sarah Jones, How Obamacare Became a Winning Issue, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 16, 2018), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/151633/obamacare-became-winning-issue. 
 34. See Dan Diamond, Facing Oversight, Trump’s ACA Defense Strategy Is Taking Shape, POLITICO (Dec. 
20, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-pulse/2018/12/20/facing-oversight-
trumps-aca-defense-strategy-is-taking-shape-462043?tab=most-read. 
 35. Most recently now, twenty states have filed a lawsuit to declare the ACA unconstitutional following 
the repeal of the individual mandate. See Erica Teichert, 20 States Sue Federal Government to Abolish 
Obamacare, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 26, 2018, 12:00 AM), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/ 
article/20180226/NEWS/180229931 (“The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the ACA in 2012, determining President 
Barack Obama’s healthcare reform law was a tax penalty. But the tax cuts signed by President Donald Trump 
in December zeroed out the penalty, and the rest of the ACA can’t stand as law without it, according to the 
states.”). 
February 2020] AFFORDING OBAMACARE 267 
Americans—particularly those who receive no tax subsidies from the 
government—remain “unquestionably worse off” under the ACA.36  
By seeking to insulate individuals from the cost of their health insurance, 
the ACA abdicated any effort to actually bring down the cost of health care—to 
actually set prices for MRIs, for example. The government has sought to provide 
relief to individuals without addressing the prices of health care. It failed to 
spend as much regulatory energy on the cost of the $629 Band-Aid as it did on 
subsidies to purchase insurance, for example.37 But without more creative 
architecture in these private marketplaces, health care expenditures will continue 
to grow faster than Americans’ paychecks. Coupled with a president hostile to 
its survival, the ACA’s shields are primed to crack for more and more citizens.38  
Health care that is too expensive leads to health insurance that is too 
expensive.39 Like a boat taking on water, without a coordinated effort to address 
the cost challenge of American health care, the ACA’s glittery access gains seem 
precariously wobbly in 2019.40 Using the ACA’s markets—not just to guarantee 
shaky health insurance access, but as a cost containment mechanism—remains 
an underdeveloped option, both in the literature and in practice. To secure its 
survival, the ACA must make private insurance companies prioritize cost control 
through new incentives learned from behavioral economics. 
This Article sets forth a new frame for conceiving of cost control on the 
private market, pushing to bring ideas from behavioral economics and value-
based purchasing onto the ACA’s individual exchange marketplace. Mirroring 
other areas of modern health law and policy, the subsidy and compensation 
structure on the ACA marketplace could be organized to incorporate shared 
savings tools, redirecting incentives so that insurance companies that negotiate 
                                                        
 36. See Julie Rovner, Steep Premiums Challenge People Who Buy Health Insurance Without Subsidies, 
NPR (Oct. 7, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/10/07/555957419/steep-
premiums-challenge-people-who-buy-health-insurance-without-subsidies. 
 37. See Sarah Kliff, The Case of the $629 Band-Aid—And What It Reveals About American Health Care, 
VOX (May 13, 2016, 8:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/5/13/11606760/emergency-facility-fees-american-
health-care. 
 38. See, e.g., Helaine Olen, Even the Insured Often Can’t Afford Their Medical Bills, ATLANTIC (June 18, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/medical-bills/530679/ (“Another study, this one 
published in JAMA Oncology, found the price of one month of an oral-cancer medication increased from $1,869 
in 2000 to $11,325 in 2014. As insurance companies, desperate to clamp down on their own expenses, cut 
reimbursements for the more expensive drugs, and employers, hoping to cut their own costs, push employees 
into high-deductible health-insurance plans, more of this cost ends up being picked up by the patients.”). 
 39. See Jay Hancock and Shefali Luthra, High Deductibles Are Forcing Employees to Pay More Money 
Out of Pocket, TIME (Sept. 15, 2016), http://time.com/money/4494938/high-deductible-health-plans-employee-
costs/ (noting that, regarding employer-based insurance, “[s]ince 2011, the average deductible for single 
coverage has soared 63 percent . . . while workers’ earnings have gone up by only 11 percent.”). “Single 
coverage” premiums raised 19% during that same period from 2011 to 2016. See id; see also Olen, supra note 
38. Abby Goodnough, As Some Got Free Health Care, Gwen Got Squeezed: An Obamacare Dilemma, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/health/obamacare-premiums-medicaid.html. 
 40. The insurance rate already likely reached a high-water mark, with the number of insured Americans 
likely to drop throughout 2019. See Tami Luhby, 9 Million Fewer Americans Expected to Have Health Insurance 
in 2019, CNN (Feb. 26, 2018, 7:47 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/02/26/news/economy/ 
obamacare-trump-insurance/index.html. 
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the deepest discounts would be rewarded by the most substantial government 
subsidies. This shift would seek to address the nagging problem of the price of 
health care, and, in contradistinction from other policy solutions, would act on 
the insurers and not the insureds on the market, seeking to stabilize either the 
ACA or whatever comes next. 
This Article will make these arguments in four parts. In Part I, the current 
state of the ACA will be documented. In Part II, enduring conflicts of interest 
baked into the ACA’s marketplace will be highlighted. In Part III, the field of 
behavioral economics, both its doctrinal development and utility in other parts 
of health law and policy, will be sketched. Finally, in Part IV, a new shared 
savings for insurance companies on the ACA marketplace will be proposed. 
I.  AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE HANG-UPS  
America’s health policy scaffolding reflects a delicate balance between 
universality and exclusivity, laws and markets, resulting in fragmented 
implementation and political volatility.41 Health care in the country is both an 
open public emergency room and the ruthless private insurance marketplace. 
America wants both universal and conditional health insurance coverage.42 It 
provides generous health care access to sixty-five-year-olds, but charges sixty-
four-year-olds $21,000 for a diagnosis of indigestion.43 It provides coverage for 
those living in poverty, but some states—inexplicably—impose premiums on 
them.44 It still does not provide health insurance for all, but requires hospitals to 
                                                        
 41. Support for the Affordable Care Act has swung over the last eight years—from a low of 33% support 
in November 2013, to a high of 52% in August of 2017. See Ashley Kirzinger et al., Kaiser Health Tracking 
Poll—August 2017: The Politics of ACA Repeal and Replace Efforts, KAISER FAM. FOUND. fig.7 (Aug. 11, 2017), 
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-august-2017-the-politics-of-aca-
repeal-and-replace-efforts/. Another poll had approval reaching 55% by early 2017. See Norman, supra note 28. 
 42. See Jonathan Easley, Poll: Majority Supports Single-Payer Health Care, HILL (Sept. 22, 2017, 1:39 
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/351928-poll-majority-supports-single-payer-healthcare. See Nicholas 
Bagley and Eli Savit, Michigan’s Discriminatory Work Requirements, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/opinion/michigan-medicaid-work-requirement.html (“Those in 
predominantly white rural counties with high unemployment are exempt from the work requirements. Those in 
predominantly black cities with high unemployment are not.”); see also Aaron Blake, Medicaid Work 
Requirements Are One of the Least Politically Controversial Things Trump Has Done, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/01/11/medicaid-work-requirements-are-one-
of-the-least-politically-controversial-things-trump-has-done/?utm_term=.1eaba7b1d067. 
 43. See Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME MAG. (Apr. 4, 2013), 
https://time.com/198/bitter-pill-why-medical-bills-are-killing-us/ (“The bad news was the bill: $995 for the 
ambulance ride, $3,000 for the doctors and $17,000 for the hospital—in sum, $21,000 for a false 
alarm. . . . Because she was 64, not 65, Janice S. was not on Medicare. . . . It turns out that Medicare would have 
paid Stamford $13.94 for each troponin test rather than the $199.50 Janice S. was charged.”). 
 44. See MaryBeth Musumeci et al., Approved Changes in Indiana’s Section 1115 Medicaid Waiver 
Extension, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/approved-changes-in-
indianas-section-1115-medicaid-waiver-extension/ (“Monthly premiums apply to all beneficiaries from 0-138% 
FPL based on income and are at least $1.00.”). Premiums are “tiered,” in that individuals making less than 22% 
of FPL (income ranges from $0 to $223 per month) are charged $1.00 per month, whereas individuals making 
between 23% and 50% of FPL (income ranges from $223 to $506 per month) are charged $5.00 per month. Id. 
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treat all, without regard to ability to pay, in an emergency.45 Impoverished 
citizens receive health insurance through the state’s Medicaid program—
assuming they are impoverished—but only for those belonging to one of the 
fortressed categories making up the “deserving poor.”46 
A complex regulatory structure results because “we are trying to use 
markets to distribute something that, at the end of the day, we don’t want 
distributed according to market forces.”47 Indeed, health care in America is a 
human right,48 a moral cause,49 a foundation for human flourishing,50 and it is a 
consumer good,51 a risk pool,52 and a deductible.53 In this view, American health 
policy becomes a battle not over how to cure the market, but over when to 
appropriately empower and when to properly avoid it.54 The history of health 
care policy in America, then, is punctuated by a mix of market-based and 
market-eschewing solutions.  
In the ultimate transformative opportunity in 2010, America cemented 
long-term shortcomings in the individual marketplace.55 The ACA both 
                                                        
 45. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT ACT AND LABOR 
ACT (EMTALA), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EMTALA/index (last updated 
Mar. 26, 2012). 
 46. See Annie Lowrey, The People Left Behind When Only the “Deserving” Poor Get Help, ATLANTIC, 
(May 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/05/the-people-who-are-left-behind-when-
only-the-deserving-poor-get-help/528018/. Medicaid has limited its coverage to discrete groups throughout its 
history. Id. 
 47. James Kwak, The Problem with Obamacare, BASELINE SCENARIO (May 9, 2016), 
https://baselinescenario.com/2016/05/09/the-problem-with-obamacare/. 
 48. See Matt Taibbi, Finally Everyone Agrees: Health Care Is a Human Right, ROLLING STONE (June 30, 
2017, 5:14 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/taibbi-finally-everyone-agrees-health-care-is-a-
human-right-w490605. 
 49. See Jack Craver, Most Americans View Health Care as a Moral Issue, BENEFITSPRO (Sept. 9, 2015, 
11:54 AM), http://www.benefitspro.com/2015/09/09/most-americans-view-health-care-as-moral-issue; see also 
Sharona Hoffman, Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairness in Health Care Coverage, 78 IND. L.J. 659, 672 
(2003) (“Moral fairness . . . would forbid abandonment of the sick and disabled.”). 
 50. See Atul Gawande, Is Health Care a Right?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 25 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/02/is-health-care-a-right (“[The ACA] sever[s] care from our 
foundational agreement that, when it comes to the most basic needs and burdens of life and liberty, all lives have 
equal worth.”). 
 51. See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete 
Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1999) (“Opponents of 
regulation . . . typically argue that the free market will more efficiently allocate resources among health care and 
other consumer goods than will government mandates.”). But see Lawrence Singer, Health Care Is Not a Typical 
Consumer Good and We Should Not Rely on Incentivized Consumers to Allocate It, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 703, 
703 (2017) (“Many believe that health care is, or should be treated as, a ‘typical’ economic good.”). 
 52. What Are “High-Risk Pools” and Do They Lower Health Care Costs?, NPR (May 6, 2017, 7:48 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/05/06/527140030/what-are-high-risk-pools-and-do-they-lower-health-care-costs. 
 53. See Russell Korobkin, Health-Care Costs and the “Moral Hazard” Problem, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/10/health-care-costs-and-the-
moral-hazard-problem/?utm_term=.88c212bf2380. 
 54. See Kwak, supra note 47 (“The dirty not-so-secret of Obamacare, however, is that sometimes the things 
we don’t like about market outcomes aren’t market failures—they are exactly what markets are supposed to 
do.”). 
 55. See Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Health Care For?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
1689, 1705 (2018) (“Despite being a major federal intervention in health policy, the ACA perpetuated and 
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extended (closer to) universal access to its citizenry and stimulated a new private 
insurance marketplace, carefully contorting itself to harm the market as little as 
possible. The ACA tightened the regulatory screws against insurance companies 
but awarded them millions more customers and revenue.56 It outlawed the 
exclusion of individuals with preexisting conditions but allowed insurers to price 
insurance by zip code, ultimately doing little to bring down the global cost of 
health care.57 The law incentivizes insurance companies’ participation—in both 
individual and private employer marketplaces58—by heavily subsidizing them 
with public funds.59 It genetically engineers an artificial market by propping up 
both buyers and sellers.60 
But this is nothing new. America’s conflictual health policy development 
has followed a simple pattern: legislative solutions that have nobly but languidly 
expanded access, have been short on devising solutions designed to contain the 
costs of—or, more directly, pay for61—those gains in access. No example of 
America’s health care contradiction is more apt than the conspicuously named 
Affordable Care Act,62 a law that guarantees access to millions more Americans, 
but does little to make the cost of health care any more affordable for the 
                                                        
entrenched the fragmentation of U.S. health care by expanding the various and very differently structured 
healthcare programs already in existence.”). 
 56. See Sam Baker, How the Authors of Obamacare Protected Insurance Companies, ATLANTIC (Nov. 10, 
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/11/how-the-authors-of-obamacare-protected-
insurance-companies/440853/; Bertha Coombs, As Obamacare Twists in Political Winds, Top Insurers Made $6 
Billion (Not that There Is Anything Wrong with That), CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/05/top-health-
insurers-profit-surge-29-percent-to-6-billion-dollars.html (last updated Aug. 6, 2017, 10:16 AM). 
 57. See Kaiser Calculator Now Gives Consumers 2015 Zip Code-Specific Premium and Tax Credit 
Estimates for Marketplace Coverage, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.kff.org/health-
reform/press-release/kaiser-calculator-now-gives-consumers-2015-zip-code-specific-premium-and-tax-credit-
estimates-for-marketplace-coverage/. 
 58. See, e.g., Kate Zernike, The Hidden Subsidy that Helps Pay for Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/health/health-insurance-tax-deduction.html (“[Tax breaks for 
employer-sponsored insurance] costs the federal government $250 billion in lost tax revenue every 
year . . . [and] economists on the left and the right argue that to really rein in health costs, Congress should scale 
back or eliminate the tax exclusion on what employers pay toward employees’ health insurance premiums.”); 
see also Health Insurance Marketplace Calculator, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 1, 2018), 
https://www.kff.org/interactive/subsidy-calculator/. 
 59. Zernike, supra note 58; see also BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUM TAX 
CREDITS AND COST-SHARING SUBSIDIES: IN BRIEF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 9 (2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44425.pdf (“For tax year 2014, approximately 3.4 million tax returns indicated 
receipt of advance payments of the ACA tax credit, totaling to almost $12 billion.”). 
 60. Indeed, this market is dependent upon a committed, supportive government to work. The Trump 
Administration has shown how important this is to the functioning of the ACA’s individual exchange 
marketplaces. 
 61. See, e.g., William P. Gunnar, The Fundamental Law that Shapes the United States Health Care System: 
Is Universal Health Care Realistic Within the Established Paradigm?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 151, 173 (2006) 
(noting that “EMTALA represents an unfunded mandate”); Laura D. Hermer, The Scapegoat: EMTALA and 
Emergency Department Overcrowding, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 695, 702 (2006) (“Thus, EMTALA’s ‘unfunded 
mandate’ becomes a target for providers’ ire in an increasingly pinched system.”). 
 62. “One of the ACA’s key failings is that, despite its name, it does far too little to make coverage truly 
affordable for many economically squeezed Americans.” Josh Mound, How to Win Medicare for All, DISSENT, 
Spring 2018, at 23, 24. 
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citizenry. Cost-efficiency tools—that rely on deploying markets in a more 
targeted and efficient way that could have been activated—were simply left on 
the cutting room floor.63 
A. THE ACA AS AN ENDURING SPLIT DECISION 
The ACA came on the scene on March 23, 2010 with one main goal: to 
increase access to health insurance, and ultimately, health care, for its 
populace.64 It accomplished this by (1) initially mandatorily, and then 
voluntarily (after NFIB v. Sebelius),65 asking states to expand their Medicaid 
programs, and (2) building a private insurance marketplace, known as an 
exchange or marketplace, for citizens who lacked health insurance—largely due 
to work, financial, or health status—to purchase health insurance with the 
assistance of governmental subsidies. These two goals have worked to 
drastically lower the number of uninsured individuals.66 They have also shifted 
societal norms.67 “Preexisting condition” has become a term firmly ensconced 
in public discourse.68 Admirably, and undeniably, the ACA went further to 
improve health care access than any federal reform since the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs were conceived as part of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
Great Society in 1965.69  
The balance of this analysis focuses on the newly constructed federal 
marketplace. In order to build the marketplace, the federal government required 
                                                        
 63. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 64. The United States still lags behind many other countries on quality and cost measures, largely related 
to insurance coverage. See Olga Khazan, What’s Actually Wrong With the U.S. Health System, ATLANTIC (July 
14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/07/us-worst-health-care-commonwealth-2017-
report/533634/ (“The ways to fix these issues . . . are to increase the rate of insurance coverage and access to 
primary care, streamline the insurance system so that there are less administrative hurdles for doctors, and funnel 
more money toward better nutrition and housing, rather than specialty care.”). 
 65. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 66. By the end of 2015, more than 19 million Americans had gained health insurance due to the ACA. See 
BOWEN GARRETT & ANUJ GANGOPADHYAYA, WHO GAINED HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE ACA, 
AND WHERE DO THEY LIVE?, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. & URB. INST. 4 (2016), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/86761/2001041-who-gained-health-insurance-coverage-
under-the-aca-and-where-do-they-live.pdf. 
 67. See Kristen Bialik, More Americans Say Government Should Ensure Health Care Coverage, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/13/more-americans-say-government-
should-ensure-health-care-coverage/ (“Currently, 60% of Americans say the government should be responsible 
for ensuring health care coverage for all Americans, compared with 38% who say this should not be the 
government’s responsibility. The share saying it is the government’s responsibility has increased from 51% last 
year and now stands at its highest point in nearly a decade.”). 
 68. See Jackie Farwell, Mainers, Here are the Basics on Pre-Existing Medical Conditions, BANGOR DAILY 
NEWS (May 10, 2017), http://vitalsigns.bangordailynews.com/2017/05/10/affordable-care-act/mainers-here-
are-the-basics-on-pre-existing-medical-conditions/ (“The term is insurance company jargon but it’s quickly 
becoming part of the popular lexicon.”). 
 69. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, The “New Federalism” Approach to Medicaid: Empirical Evidence that 
Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the States Harms Public Health, 90 KY. L.J. 973, 978 (2002) (“Begun in 
1965 as a virtual afterthought to the Social Security Act’s Medicare Program, Medicaid was enacted as a part of 
President Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ legislation to provide access to healthcare for America’s poor, 
disabled and elderly.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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the private individual health insurance market to undertake a grand reorganizing 
through dense new regulations, one in which participating insurance companies 
consented to cover preventive care services,70 essential health benefits,71 and 
individuals with preexisting conditions,72 all while agreeing to abstain from 
medical underwriting,73 which had previously allowed insurance companies to 
“price in” the amount of risk that each beneficiary represented.74 To sweeten the 
deal, the federal government promised to heavily subsidize the new market,75 to 
protect the companies from uncertainty,76 and, most importantly, to force 
millions of Americans—notably, healthy ones—into the market.77  
But what the law did not do was constrict the price of health care on the 
front end in any meaningful way.78 Although they were considered, no cost-
constricting mechanisms were ultimately adopted.79 In other words, the ACA 
                                                        
 70. See Background: The Affordable Care Act’s New Rules on Preventive Care, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND 
& MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/preventive-care-
background.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (documenting information about preventive care coverage). 
 71. See Information on Essential Health Benefits (EHB) Benchmark Plans, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/data-resources/ehb.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2020); 
Shelby Livingston, Most ACA Exchange Plans Feature a Narrow Network, MOD. HEALTHCARE, (Dec. 4, 2018, 
12:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20181204/NEWS/181209976. 
 72. See The Politics of Pre-Existing Conditions, WEEK (Dec. 1, 2018), 
https://theweek.com/articles/809983/politics-preexisting-conditions (“The Affordable Care Act . . . bars 
insurers from denying coverage or charging higher premiums to individuals with pre-existing conditions.”). 
 73. See Mark A. Hall, The Competitive Impact of Small Group Health Insurance Reform Laws, 32 MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 685, 687–88 (1999) (describing medical underwriting as risk rating applicants based on age and 
health status and of deploying practices that limits enrollment of those with preexisting conditions); Sara 
Rosenbaum et al., Crossing the Rubicon: The Impact of the Affordable Care Act on the Content of Insurance 
Coverage for Persons with Disabilities, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 527, 533 (2011) (describing 
underwriting as actuarial rating, which is “a system of pricing insurance premiums based on an individual’s 
likelihood of utilizing covered medical care”). 
 74. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 73, at 533–34. 
 75. See Explaining Health Care Reform: Questions About Health Insurance Subsidies, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaining-health-care-reform-
questions-about-health/. 
 76. See Cynthia Cox et al., Explaining Health Care Reform: Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk 
Corridors, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaining-
health-care-reform-risk-adjustment-reinsurance-and-risk-corridors/ (“The program worked by cushioning 
insurers participating in exchanges and marketplaces from extreme gains and losses.”). 
 77. Questions and Answers on the Individual Shared Responsibility Provision, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/individuals-and-families/questions-and-answers-on-the-individual-
shared-responsibility-provision (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). The individual mandate has since been repealed. See 
Robert Pear, Individual Mandate Now Gone, G.O.P. Targets the One for Employers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/us/politics/employer-mandate.html. 
 78. Prices continue to rise. See Brad Tuttle, Here’s What’s Happened to Health Care Costs in America in 
the Obama Years, TIME (Oct. 4, 2016), http://time.com/money/4503325/obama-health-care-costs-obamacare/. 
 79. See Helen A. Halpin and Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of the Public Option, 29 HEALTH 
AFF. 1117, 1119 (2010), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0363 (noting that the 
public option was “omitted” from the final legislation adopted that would become the Affordable Care Act). 
Nonetheless, the public option has been in and out of the public consciousness during health policy debates since 
2010. See, e.g., Hillary Clinton, My Vision for Universal, Quality, Affordable Health Care, NEW ENG. J. 
MEDICINE (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsb1612292 (“And finally, we need to 
ensure the availability of a public option choice in every state, and let Americans over 55 buy in to Medicare.”); 
see also Reed Abelson and Margot Sanger-Katz, The Health Care “Public Option” Is Back. Can It Help 
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does not tell pharmaceutical companies or hospitals how much to charge for 
certain services, nor does it adequately empower America’s payers to 
aggressively negotiate; instead, it seeks to insulate Americans from painful 
expenditures. As a result, the ACA’s popularity and effectiveness are largely 
impacted by two factors: (1) how many additional people have achieved health 
insurance access because of its provisions; and (2) how expensive and 
burdensome those insurance plans—and the concomitant care that accompanies 
those plans—are for these new beneficiaries. On this second factor, this is where 
the architecture of the marketplace has become paramount. 
1. The Undeniable Accomplishment of Access 
Reading the public statements that accompanied its passage in 2010, one 
would think that the ACA represented the “end of history”80 for America’s 
journey toward universal access to health care for its citizens. Before the final 
House vote on the ACA, Speaker Nancy Pelosi—who, more than any other 
legislator, deserves praise for its passage81—said “[t]oday we have the 
opportunity to complete the great unfinished business of our country.”82 Indeed, 
as has been said, it may have been “the most important event of the Obama 
presidency.”83 
President Obama was less sanguine. “This legislation will not fix 
everything that ails our health care system, but it moves us decisively in the right 
direction,” he said upon its passage.84 In a statement striking for its multiple post 
hoc translations—both conveying the gravity of the moment and recognizing the 
incremental nature of its reform—Obama noted that “[t]his is what change looks 
like.”85 Vice President Joe Biden was less measured, but surely more colorful.86 
                                                        
Obamacare?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/upshot/the-health-care-
public-option-is-back-can-it-help-obamacare.html (noting that, in 2010, the public option “was a no-go even 
with Democratic control of both branches [of Congress] in 2010”); Mara Gay, Why Lieberman Hates the Public 
Option, ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 2009), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/10/why-lieberman-hates-
the-public-option/347740/ (“The public option was on a roll. Then, on Tuesday, Sen. Joe Lieberman threatened 
to filibuster the health care bill if it includes a public option, which he says would create ‘trouble for taxpayers, 
for the premium payers and for the national debt.’”). The election of the Scott Brown to the Senate in 
Massachusetts served as “a death blow to the public option.” Bob Cusack et al., The Chaotic Fight for 
ObamaCare, HILL (Feb. 10, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/268877-the-chaotic-fight-for-
obamacare. 
 80. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) (arguing that liberal 
democracy could signify the end of “ideological evolution,” or the “end of history”). 
 81. See Cusack et al., supra note 79. 
 82. See Karen Tumulty, Making History: House Passes Health Care Reform, TIME (Mar. 23, 2010), 
http://content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1973989,00.html.  
 83. See David Blumenthal et al., The Affordable Care Act at Five Years, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2451, 2451 
(2015), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMhpr1503614. 
 84. See Tumulty, supra note 82 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85. Id. Ewen MacAskill, Barack Obama’s Healthcare Bill Passed by Congress, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2010, 
3:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/22/us-healthcare-bill-passes-congress. 
 86. See Brian Montopoli, Biden Swears at Bill Signing: Just Biden Being Biden?, CBS NEWS (Mar. 23, 
2010, 2:18 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/biden-swears-at-bill-signing-just-biden-being-biden/ 
(describing Vice President Biden as telling President Obama that “passage of the bill is a ‘big [fucking] deal’”). 
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And regarding structural access to health care, Biden was right: the ACA 
has been a game-changer.87 It has ushered in rapid changes to America’s 
complex health insurance system. Millions of Americans have gained access to 
insurance through massive expansions,88 accomplished both by (1) Medicaid 
expansion and (2) the individual exchange, in which federal government-funded 
tax subsidies and cost sharing reduction payments help citizens pay for health 
insurance and care.89 The law has been “surprisingly resilient,”90 perhaps most 
tellingly on the score of health care insurance coverage, even after regulatory 
changes brought about by the Trump administration shrunk the number of 
insured Americans,91 and made health insurance both more expensive and harder 
to find.92 More recent proposals from the Trump administration will likely 
continue this trend.93  
On perhaps its most important metric, by just the third year of the ACA’s 
implementation, the American uninsurance rate had dropped to 10.3% of the 
U.S. population.94 This was a stark change from the historic uninsurance rate for 
the two decades preceding the ACA’s passage, during which the rate had reliably 
                                                        
 87. See generally GARRETT & GANGOPADHYAYA, supra note 66 (offering an overview on the positive 
change the ACA has brought). 
 88. Id. at 7. 
 89. See Linda Qiu, Calling Cost-Sharing Reduction Payments “a Bailout” Is Misleading, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/us/politics/cost-sharing-reductions-bailout.html; John Ydstie, 
How the Affordable Care Act Pays for Insurance Subsidies, NPR (Nov. 7, 2013, 2:57 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/11/07/243584170/how-the-affordable-care-act-pays-for-
insurance-subsidies. 
 90. Peter Sullivan, ObamaCare Proves Surprisingly Resilient, HILL (Dec. 25, 2017, 5:57 AM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/366239-obamacare-proves-surprisingly-resilient; see also Harold Pollack, 
Republicans Couldn’t Kill Obamacare. That’s the Genius of Its Design., WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/03/29/republicans-couldnt-kill-obamacare-thats-
the-genius-of-its-design/?utm_term=.d421a6699c6d (“And in doing so, it has quietly embedded itself within the 
fabric of American life—and has become very difficult for politicians to kill.”). 
 91. Nonetheless, the changes were not as impactful as originally feared. See National ACA Marketplace 
Signups Dipped a Modest 3.7 Percent This Year, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 7, 2018), 
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/press-release/national-aca-marketplace-signups-dipped-a-modest-3-7-
percent-this-year/. 
 92. Id. (noting that more than 11.7 million Americans signed up for health insurance on the ACA exchange, 
“amid steep reductions in federal funding for outreach and navigators, an enrollment period half as long, and a 
climate of political uncertainty surrounding the law”). 
 93. See Margot Sanger-Katz, A Big Divergence Is Coming in Health Care Among States, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/upshot/health-care-obamacare-states-divergence.html (“Taken 
together, experts say, the administration’s actions will tend to increase the price of health insurance that follows 
all the Affordable Care Act’s rules and increase the popularity of health plans that cover fewer services. The 
result could be divided markets, where healthier people buy lightly regulated plans that don’t cover much health 
care, lower earners get highly subsidized Obamacare—and sicker middle-class people face escalating costs for 
insurance with comprehensive benefits.”). 
 94. Key Facts About the Uninsured Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 7, 2018), 
https://www.kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/ (this uninsurance rate 
amounts to about 28 million people). 
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hovered between 16% and 18% of the population.95 In an access battle that had 
been fought for generations,96 the ACA made real headway. 
Of course, most of the heaviest lifting was accomplished by the relentlessly 
battered Medicaid program.97 By November of 2018, thirty-six states and the 
District of Columbia—a high-water mark98—had expanded their workhorse 
Medicaid programs under the ACA,99 additionally insuring a total of more than 
11 million beneficiaries.100 By the end of 2018, only fourteen states—
concentrated in the southeast and central plains—had not expanded Medicaid.101 
Largely driven by its expansion under the ACA, by the end of 2017, 
Medicaid covered approximately 74 million beneficiaries—up from about 57 
million before the ACA was passed.102 As of 2018, more than 20% of Americans 
received insurance through Medicaid, and, judging from public polling and 
various other developments, this number may yet grow in the future.103 Vitally, 
                                                        
 95. Id. 
 96. Health care access was slowly extended to more and more groups of Americans since the advent of 
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. See, e.g., Eligibility, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMMISSION, 
https://www.macpac.gov/medicaid-101/eligibility/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (“Between 1984 and 1990, 
however, Congress made a number of changes that expanded Medicaid for pregnant women and children.”). 
 97. The American Health Care Act—the bill that passed the Republican-led House of Representatives— 
would have installed a per capita cap on the safety net program. See Julia Paradise, Restructuring Medicaid in 
the American Health Care Act: Five Key Considerations, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 15, 2017), 
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/restructuring-medicaid-in-the-american-health-care-act-five-key-
considerations/. 
 98. Medicaid expansion is cheaper for the federal government than paying for premium-assistant tax 
credits for the ACA’s individual exchange. See Susannah Luthi, ACA Subsidies Cost More Per Person Than 
Medicaid. Is that Sustainable?, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 8, 2018, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180808/NEWS/180809915 (“The CBO’s latest projection from 
earlier this year show government paying out an average of $6,300 annually for every subsidized enrollee in 
fiscal 2018. It estimates that number will rise to nearly $12,500 in 2028. In contrast, Medicaid spends $4,230 
per non-disabled adult, set to inflate at 5.2% annually to just over $7,000 per person in 2028.”). 




 100. See Leighton Ku et al., Data Note: Medicaid’s Role in Providing Access to Preventive Care for Adults, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 17, 2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/data-note-medicaids-role-in-
providing-access-to-preventive-care-for-adults/. 
 101. See Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decision: Interactive Map, supra note 99. 




 103. See Joel Ebert & Dave Boucher, Behind Closed Doors, Haslam Asks Again: Can Tennessee Expand 
Health Care for Working Poor?, TENNESSEAN, https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/ 
2018/04/13/can-tennessee-expand-health-care-working-poor-haslam-asks-behind-closed-doors/511878002/ 
(last updated Apr. 13, 2018, 2:52 PM; Mallory Noe-Payne, Medicaid Expansion in Virginia Inches Closer to 
Reality, WVTF (Apr. 6, 2018), http://wvtf.org/post/medicaid-expansion-virginia-inches-closer-reality; Texans 
Want to Expand Medicaid. Politicians Don’t, HOUS. CHRON. (Sept. 14, 2018, 4:47 PM), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Texans-want-to-expand-Medicaid-Politicians-
13228093.php. 
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expanding coverage for the Medicaid population is likely to translate into 
increases in the amount of individuals receiving preventive care.104 
The ACA has made the most progress in states that have implemented the 
Medicaid expansion and supported their individual private health insurance 
exchanges. For example, California’s uninsured rate had dropped from 17% 
before the implementation of the ACA to 6.8% during the middle of 2017.105 
After the first few years of the ACA, Illinois’ uninsured population had shrunk 
from 1.6 million to just 817,000.106 Large swaths of Oregon, Nevada, New 
Mexico, southern Colorado, southwest Texas, and Arkansas have shown double-
digit jump in health insurance rates since its passage.107 
In addition to broadening access to health insurance, the ACA also 
deepened the quality of health insurance coverage. The ACA made preventive 
care and chronic disease treatment—in addition to a number of other 
treatments—available to millions of Americans.108 Under the law, non-
grandfathered insurance plans cover—without any cost sharing—a number of 
preventive cancer screenings, chronic condition screenings, immunizations, 
counseling services, pre-natal screenings and supports, and contraception and 
reproductive health screenings and counseling.109 
The ACA reformed the individual marketplace from the inside-out, adding 
to the number of plans with comprehensive coverage. Most notably, the ACA 
prohibited annual and lifetime limits for health insurance plans,110 outlawed 
preexisting conditions,111 and banned medical underwriting.112 In a noteworthy 
                                                        
 104. See Miguel Marino et al., Receipt of Preventive Services After Oregon’s Randomized Medicaid 
Experiment, 50 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 161 (2016) (“[T]his study demonstrates a causal relationship 
between Medicaid coverage and receipt of several preventive services in CHC patients, including receipt of 
breast and cervical cancer screenings as well as screenings for BMI, blood pressure, and smoking, during a three-
year follow up.”). 
 105. See Cathie Anderson, California’s Uninsured Rate Drops to New Low, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 21, 
2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/health-and-medicine/article185812078.html. 
 106. See Lisa Schencker, Illinois Uninsured Rate Falls Again—But for How Long?, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 12, 
2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-health-insurance-coverage-increases-0913-biz-20170912-
story.html. 
 107. See Kevin Quealy and Margot Sanger-Katz, Obama’s Health Law: Who Was Helped Most, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 29, 2014) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/29/upshot/obamacare-who-was-helped-
most.html. 
 108. Key Facts About the Uninsured Population, supra note 94. 
 109. Preventive Services Covered by Private Health Plans Under the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (Aug. 4, 2015) https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/preventive-services-covered-by-private-
health-plans/. 
 110. Lifetime & Annual Limits, HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/about-the-
aca/benefit-limits/index.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2017). 
 111. Pre-Existing Conditions, HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/about-the-aca/pre-
existing-conditions/index.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2017). 
 112. Gary Claxton et al., Pre-Existing Conditions and Medical Underwriting in the Individual Insurance 
Market Prior to the ACA, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 12, 2016) https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-
brief/pre-existing-conditions-and-medical-underwriting-in-the-individual-insurance-market-prior-to-the-aca/ 
(“Prior to 2014 medical underwriting was permitted in the individual insurance market in 45 states and DC.”). 
See Hall, supra note 73 (noting that medical underwriting is risking rating applicants based on age and health 
status and of limiting enrollment of those with preexisting conditions). 
February 2020] AFFORDING OBAMACARE 277 
regulatory provision, the ACA also strictly limited the profits that health 
insurance companies can pocket on the exchanges through medical-loss ratio 
regulations.113  
2. Cost Expenditure Growth 
It is a well-worn refrain by now: American health care is too expensive.114 
The country spends $3.6 trillion annually on health care, which amounts to 
$11,172 per person.115 It now accounts for 17.7% of the gross domestic product 
(GDP).116 And it will continue to grow in stature. American health expenditures 
are forecasted to hit $6 trillion, and nearly 20% of the GDP, by 2027.117 America 
spends more, on average, than any other peer country.118 Indeed, the trends are 
certainly worsening. The United States’ gap in health care spending—between 
it and every other country—has precipitously widened over the last 50 years.119 
The ACA’s ability to positively impact the cost of American health care 
has been “mixed.”120 From a global perspective, the growth of national health 
expenditures rose with the implementation of the ACA, and then slowed in 
2016.121 In 2016, both “the federal government and households accounted for 
the largest shares of health care spending,” each responsible for 28% of overall 
health care expenditures.122 
                                                        
 113. Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 29, 2012) 
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/explaining-health-care-reform-medical-loss-ratio-mlr/. 
 114. See Austin Frakt, Medical Mystery: Something Happened to U.S. Health Spending After 1980, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/upshot/medical-mystery-health-spending-
1980.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=image&module=second-column-
region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news. Recent work has suggested that America’s health care cost 
spending became anomalous—as compared to other countries—starting in 1980. Id.  
 115. See National Health Expenditure Data: Historical, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (last updated Dec. 17, 2019). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See National Health Expenditure Projections 2018–2027, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 
(Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/ForecastSummary.pdf. 
 118. See Bradley Sawyer and Cynthia Cox, How Does Health Spending in the U.S. Compare to Other 
Countries?, PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Dec. 7, 2018) 
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health-spending-u-s-compare-
countries/?_sf_s=health+spending#item-start. Switzerland, the second-highest-spending country, allocates 
$8009 per person annually on health care. Id. Third-place Germany spends just over $5700—roughly half of 
what the United States spends. Id. The United Kingdom spends only $4246 annually; the “comparable country 
average” of other first-world countries surveyed totals around $5280. Id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See Tuttle, supra note 78. 
 121. See Micah Hartman et al., National Health Care Spending in 2016: Spending and Enrollment Growth 
Slow After Initial Coverage Expansions, 37 HEALTH AFF. 150, 151–52 (2017) (showing that national health 
expenditures grew 4.1% in 2010, 3.5% in 2011, 4.0% in 2012, 2.9% in 2013, 5.1% in 2014, 5.8% in 2015, and 
4.3% in 2016). The “faster growth in 2014 and 2015 is associated with coverage expansions under the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) and strong retail prescription drug spending growth.” Id. at 150. 
 122. Id. at 154. 
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A recent study showed that out-of-pocket expenditures dropped nearly 
12% following the increases in insurance coverage, but “premium 
contributions” increased by 12%.123 Individuals earning more than 400% of the 
federal poverty level have faced as much as a 23% increase in premiums in the 
two years since ACA implementation.124 These are individuals, thanks to the 
ACA’s subsidy structure, who face the entirety of cost premium increases.125 
Clearly, these numbers indicate that the law has benefitted the poorest 
Americans—reducing their out-of-pocket spending by more than 21%—but 
caused “middle-income households [to see] a 28 percent jump in high-burden 
premium spending,”126 leading the study’s lead author to note that the ACA has 
“reduced out-of-pocket costs,” but failed to “stem the steady rise in families’ 
premiums,” and “there is plenty of room for progress.”127 Further, “out-of-
pocket spending by consumers on health costs not covered by insurance rose 3.9 
percent [in 2016] compared with 2.8 percent in 2015.”128 
Regarding the individual market, those signing up for health insurance on 
the health insurance exchange have been subject to repeated premium jumps. In 
Tennessee, for example, carrier BlueCross BlueShield requested a 62% average 
increase in 2017 and 21% average increase in 2018.129 Cigna requested a 46% 
increase in 2017 and a 42% increase in 2018.130 A third carrier, Humana, 
requested a 44% increase in 2017, and exited the markets in 2018.131  
Although subject to a number of uniquely-affecting characteristics, 
premiums—for silver plans on the ACA exchanges—have recently made 
headlines because they are decreasing.132 But other plans’ premium increases—
undoubtedly impacted by regulatory and enforcement changes brought about by 
                                                        
 123. Anna Goldman et al., Out-of-Pocket Spending and Premium Contributions After Implementation of the 
Affordable Care Act, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 347, 348 (2018). 
 124. See Dan Mangan, Out-Of-Pocket Health Spending Dropped by Nearly 12 Percent—But Premiums Rose 
After Obamacare Roll Out, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/22/out-of-pocket-health-spending-dropped-
after-obamacare-rolled-out.html (last updated Jan. 22, 2018, 3:20 PM). In 2018, 400% of federal poverty level 
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income. See Federal Poverty Guidelines, FAMILIES USA, (July 2018) https://familiesusa.org/product/federal-
poverty-guidelines. 
 125. See infra notes 189–202 and accompanying text. 
 126. Mangan, supra note 124. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Toni Clarke, U.S. Healthcare Spending Growth Slowed in 2016, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2017, 1:07 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare-report/u-s-healthcare-spending-growth-slowed-in-2016-
idUSKBN1E031D. 
 129. See Holly Fletcher, Tennessee’s ACA Market “Even Less Secure” After Failed Repeal, Insurance Chief 
Frets, TENNESSEAN, https://www.tennessean.com/story/money/industries/health-care/2017/07/28/mcpeak-
questions-congressional-shore-up-aca-market-after-repeal-defeat/520001001/ (last updated July 28, 2017, 4:34 
PM). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Rachel Fehr et al., How ACA Marketplace Premiums Are Changing by County in 2019, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/how-aca-marketplace-premiums-
are-changing-by-county-in-2019/. 
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the Trump administration—are substantial.133 For example, for the 2018 market, 
a carrier in Georgia requested an average rate increase of 34.5%,134 one in 
Maryland requested one at more than 45%,135 multiple Michigan carriers 
requested increases ranging from 13% to about 27%,136 respectively, New 
Mexico’s carriers requested increases of 21%, 33%, and 49%,137 respectively, 
and one in Virginia requested an increase of 21.5 percent, with another 
requesting an increase above 54%.138 According to Kaiser:  
Looking back to 2014 . . . reveals a wide range of premium changes. In many 
of these cities, average annual premium growth over the 2014-2018 period 
has been modest, and in two cities . . . benchmark premiums have actually 
decreased. In other cities, premiums have risen rapidly over the period, 
though in some cases this rapid growth was because premiums were initially 
quite low.139 
For 2018, the premium shift for benchmark silver plans was expected to 
range from negative 5% to 49% across twenty-one major American cities.140 
Nonetheless, according to a 2017 HHS report, the “average individual market 
premiums more than doubled from $2,784 per year in 2013 to $5,712 on 
healthcare.gov in 2017.”141 Three states saw their average premiums triple from 
2013 to 2017.142  
This trend may continue. In the spring of 2018, early reporting on 
preliminary premium increases for 2019 indicated that “insurers requested hikes 
as high as 64.3 percent” in Virginia, about 11% in Vermont, and about 11% in 
Maryland.143 One plan in Maryland reportedly listed a 91.4% premium 
increase.144 But some markets are expected to stabilize, likely resulting in 
smaller premium increases.145 
                                                        
 133. See Rabah Kamal et al., An Early Look at 2018 Premium Changes and Insurer Participation on ACA 
Exchanges, KAISER FAM. FOUND., (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issuebrief/an-early-look-
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 134. Id. 
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4.6 in 2018. Id. See Fehr et al., supra note 132 (noting the number of insurance companies participating by state 
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 139. See Kamal et al., supra note 133.  
 140. Id. 
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 145. See Jessica Seaman, As Colorado’s Insurance Market Stabilizes, Officials Expect Premium Increases 
to Be Lower Than Years’ Past, DENVER POST (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/12/18/colorado-insurance-market-premiums/; see, e.g., Kristi L. Nelson, 
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Indeed, tax subsidies on the individual marketplace insulate the typical 
consumer from feeling the worst effects of those price increases.146 As the 
National Conference of State Legislatures noted, the average increase before 
subsidies was a shocking 25%.147 These increases have improved profitability 
for insurance companies, increasing the monthly gross margins per member.148  
But premium calculations are only one side of the equation; deductibles of 
the individual exchange plans have risen while the networks of coverage have 
narrowed.149 In 2018, the average deductible for an ACA exchange silver plan 
was $3937, an increase from $3703 in 2017, even though bronze plan 
deductibles were decreasing.150 Nonetheless, “the reality is, the American 
insurance system is designed to make health care financially unpleasant, often 
to the point where patients forgo necessary care.”151 Relatedly, “90 percent of 
all people on the exchanges still pay deductibles in excess of $1,300 individually 
or $2,600 per family, amounts that are often difficult to afford even for middle-
class families.”152 
Financial discomfort has not been limited to the individual marketplace. 
Similar premium price increases are present in employer-based health insurance, 
with the average cost of an “employer-sponsored family plan” totaling $12,680 
in 2008, and rising to $18,142 by 2016.153 The average worker was responsible 
for $3354 in premium costs in 2008, and in 2016, the average worker was 
responsible for premium amounts at $5277.154 More than half (51%) of survey 
                                                        
Obamacare: Lower ACA Premiums, More Options Likely for Tennesseans in 2019, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL 
(July 12, 2018, 5:16 PM), https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/health/2018/07/12/obamacare-tennessee-
lower-premiums-aca-2019/779414002/ (noting a reduction in premiums for 2019 individual exchange 
proposals). 
 146. See Rampell, supra note 143 (“Most exchange enrollees will be shielded from premium increases 
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http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-insurance-premiums.aspx. 
 148. See Cynthia Cox et al., Individual Insurance Market Performance in 2018, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 
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(last updated Nov. 30, 2017, 4:31 PM). 
 150. Id. 
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19, 2018) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/health-care-income-inequality-premiums-
deductibles-costs/550997/ (“The ACA helped reduce total bankruptcies by as many as 1.5 million between 2010 
and 2017. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that, between 2011 and 2016, the percentage 
of Americans with trouble paying medical bills dropped precipitously.”). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Tuttle, supra note 78; see also Average Annual Workplace Family Health Premiums Rise Modest 
3% to $18,142 in 2016; More Workers Enroll in High-Deductible Plans with Savings Option over Past Two 
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respondents reported that their health insurance deductibles exceeded $1000.155 
This cost is up from 16% in 2006 and 35 percent in 2008.156 Relatedly, 83% of 
those employed reported that their single coverage carries a deductible, and its 
average amount is $1478.157 In 2015, the average deductible for the same type 
of insurance was $159 less, and in 2011, it was $486 less.158 
Nonetheless, the 2016 data could very well paint a brighter picture. Survey 
results from 2016 indicated that between 2011 and 2016, health care insurance 
family premiums rose 20%, which “reflect[ed] a significant slowdown,” as 
premiums rose 31% from 2006 to 2011, and 63% from 2001 to 2006.159 Further, 
according to President Barack Obama’s White House, increases in premiums are 
much lower than they would have been without the passage and implementation 
of the ACA.160 In short, the White House argued that  
Structural changes in the health care system . . . reduced health care spending 
growth relative to the past. . . . It is therefore increasingly likely that 
structural changes in the health care system—including changes in public 
policy and other factors that would have a persistent effect on health care 
spending over the long run—are the primary reasons health care cost growth 
remains low today.161  
Finally, it has been argued that, as the deductible rate has risen, the “share 
[families in employer coverage] bear in the form of co-payments and co-
insurance has actually fallen steadily in recent years.”162 
Other works have acknowledged the fact that provisions within the ACA 
have “thus far yielded modest cost savings” and that the law has not ushered in 
a “return to the double-digit increases of the past.”163 Nonetheless, “little 
evidence” has been found to support the idea “that ACA cost containment 
provisions produced changes necessary to ‘bend the cost curve.’”164 Indeed, at 
least two major trends complicate the data: (1) the years leading up to the 
implementation of the ACA were impacted by the 2007–2009 recession;165 and 
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containment. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
282 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:261 
(2) the crush of additional insurance coverage in 2014 resulted in a substantial 
number of new beneficiaries.166 Both trends obscure a cleaner causal story 
regarding the ACA’s ability to contain the cost of American health care. It seems 
uncontroversial to assert that whether or not the ACA has been “good” for cost 
containment is subject to one’s individual circumstances; nonetheless, it has 
surely not drastically improved the prices of American health care by reversing 
cost increases. 
B. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT 
In February 2018, it was the stony stare of thirty-year-old Gwen Hurd, set 
against melting snow and beneath a blaring New York Times headline, that 
communicated an unmistakable message.167 Hurd’s story—facing a 60% 
premium increase for its health insurance plan, her family turned to the ACA 
exchange,168 where she and her husband could only find a plan with a monthly 
premium of $928 and a $6000 deductible169—is all-too-familiar for millions of 
Americans who continue to struggle.170 The glare, the snow, the weathered fence 
behind her, all of it,171 personify the persistent headwinds that continue to 
hamper the ACA. 
So do the words of Teri Goodrich and her husband, John Kistle.172 
Goodrich and Kistle, private consultants in their late fifties, were paying $1600 
per month in health care premiums and facing deductibles of $7500 each before 
dropping their ACA-purchased insurance altogether.173 They are now “trying to 
figure out how to make less than $64,000 so [they] can get subsidies.”174 One 
could also add the story of Karen Poulter, a middle-aged biologist, who pays 
premiums totaling more than $600 per month—in addition to her $400 out-of-
pocket prescription drug costs.175 Her deductible is $4000.176 She gets no federal 
tax help either.177 
The Goodriches and Poulters of the world—representative of about 2.1 
million Americans who have purchased non-subsidy assisted ACA 
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 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
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coverage178—may constitute a burning edge of the ACA.179 They do not fit into 
the positive narrative of the ACA that has finally shown up in public polling of 
the law180—its sparkling access expansions,181 health equity gains,182 and much-
needed financial protections.183 In short, the stories of Hurd, Goodrich, Kistle, 
and Poulter—representing insufficient insulation from the worst of the private 
market—illustrate the most potent long-term existential challenge for the ACA. 
To be fair, the ACA’s architects would be quick to note that Americans 
who receive health care on the individual exchanges—this year, an enrollment 
that approached 12 million Americans184—receive tax subsidies to defray the 
costs of health insurance.185 For the majority of Americans receiving premium 
assistance tax credits on the marketplace, most Americans avoid the full pain of 
rising premiums.186 In the last couple of years, between 83% and 85% of 
Americans who had signed up on the ACA exchange for health insurance 
received a tax subsidy to dull the pain of the insurance premium increases187—
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technocratic analgesics unavailable to Hurd and her family, which, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, tends to breed resentment.188  
Nonetheless, the ACA’s individual marketplace treats individuals in 
different income brackets radically different. Tightly calibrated, the exchange is 
heavily subsidized, with low earners being awarded the largest subsidies. The 
subsidy structure is a wonkish marvel, applying a sliding scale in an attempt to 
meet individuals in very different socioeconomic realities in different places. 
But the ACA’s subsidy structure has jagged cliffs. For example, based 
upon projections, a married couple with a $60,000 household income seeking 
health insurance on the exchange would receive $979 per month in subsidies and 
pay $478 per month out-of-pocket for insurance premiums.189 The same couple 
with a $70,000 household income would receive no federal tax subsidy, and 
would have to pay approximately $1457 per month in premiums.190 As a result, 
the couple making $60,000 would pay $5736 annually in health care premiums; 
the couple making $70,000 would pay $17,484. In effect, the lower-earning 
couple would come out on top after health care premiums were paid. 
This fragmentation prompts helplessness,191 resentment,192 and 
frustration,193 among those who have seen drastic premium increases: 
“Obamacare helped me,” Ms. Griffith said. “I had a pre-existing condition, 
could not get insurance and had to pay cash, nearly $30,000, for the birth of 
my first baby in 2010. For my second pregnancy in 2015, I was covered by 
Obamacare, and that was a huge financial relief.” But the costs for next year, 
she said, are mind-boggling. She and her husband, both self-employed, 
expect to pay premiums of $32,000 a year for the cheapest Optima plan 
available to their family in 2018. That is two and a half times what they now 
pay Anthem. And the annual deductible, $14,400, will be four times as high. 
“I have no choice,” Ms. Griffith said. “I agree that we need to make changes 
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in the Affordable Care Act, but we don’t have time to start over from scratch. 
We are suffering now.”194 
People who are not assisted by the subsidies are those most directly 
financially affected by the spiraling cost of American health care, and, those 
effects are painful.195 
But what makes the pain worse is that not everyone—even those in a 
nearby socioeconomic neighborhood—is experiencing it.196 The cutoffs 
between various financial cadres of households reflects state line-drawing.197 
Ms. Hurd exemplifies resentment that results when she says, “I’m totally happy 
to pay my fair share . . . but I’m also paying someone else’s share, and that’s 
what makes me insane.”198 What is true, of course, is that forcing most 
Americans to pay their “fair share” for their health care would be completely 
unsustainable.  
But the perception of unfairness persists because so many others are getting 
assistance.199 Whether these beliefs are right or wrong, decent or indecent,200 it 
is true that the ACA did focus its most robust protection on those lower on the 
socioeconomic ladder, and, where a societal good is priced in such a way that 
many Americans have trouble paying for it, this surely can breed resentment 
against the law.201 That the support of the law from those without tax subsidy 
insulation—those facing the worst of the market—has undoubtedly curdled, 
underscores the importance of rebuilding the market to better take account of the 
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system’s underlying costs. Additional challenges—for example, the cost of the 
tax-subsidy system in relation to Medicaid expansion—further highlights the 
need for an immediate solution to the cost problem.202 
II.  THE MARKET’S STRUCTURAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
That the ACA empowered private insurance companies to provide health 
insurance through the ACA exchanges—private, profit-driven, margin-obsessed 
private corporations with heavy government regulation and dual subsidies—
reflects notable, if not curious, policy architecture, mainly because the federal 
government and America’s private insurance companies share an immiscible 
conflict of interest. One has sought, prominently through the ACA, to expand 
access to insurance and care, whereas the other, to remain viable, has to limit 
access to that care. Instead of trying to protect beneficiaries by directly 
regulating the cost of care on the front end, and in lieu of negotiating with health 
insurers, the government wrote it a blank check. This structure highlights a 
challenge for the ACA’s architecture and explains why the ACA is unable to 
squeeze the cost of health care. 
Health insurance, by its nature, operates as a risk-spreading mechanism.203 
For an insurance company to increase its profits, it has to collect more in 
premiums than it pays out in claims.204 It can accomplish this goal in one of two 
ways: it can either increase premiums or cut payouts, either through establishing 
discounts with providers and hospitals or through constricting the types of 
treatments and procedures it will cover. In fact, survival and success of its 
business model depends upon its beneficiaries not accessing health care—and 
specifically not accessing expensive health care.  
This point is worth underscoring: it is not simply that health insurance 
plans are ambivalent as to whether or not their beneficiaries access health care, 
but insurance companies are dependent upon a number of their beneficiaries not 
accessing care in a given year. Their profit depends upon limiting access to 
care.205 Indeed, what made uninsured Americans unable to access health 
insurance before the ACA’s passage—from a market perspective—was the fact 
that those potential beneficiaries were unprofitable for insurance companies to 
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cover.206 Thus, the ACA had to make these beneficiaries profitable enough for 
insurance companies to cover them on the individual marketplace, ultimately 
coaxing companies to participate in the market altogether. And that is one of the 
reasons why the ACA was such a notable accomplishment.  
A. COOPERATIVE CORPORATISM  
The ACA has built a structure that is reliant on what can be called 
cooperative corporatism. The functionality of the market depends upon whether 
insurance companies—the same corporations that are required to maximize 
shareholder value and profits—are willing to participate and offer plans on the 
highly-regulated exchanges.207 If they want the markets to succeed, therefore, 
the federal government and state insurance commissioners throughout the 
country have little power to push insurance companies to hold down their price 
increases year-over-year because, of course, they are reliant on the insurance 
companies agreeing to continue to participate in the markets.208 Insufficient 
profits mean no market.  
As a result, instead of the federal government holding leverage over 
insurance companies, the ACA’s markets have been organized the other way 
around. The government becomes an involuntary partner to the price increases, 
having no ability to challenge them,209 but on the hook for funding them. 
Corporate appeasement, needless to say, is a disastrous cost control policy. 
Additionally, in this way, the ACA’s individual market functions nearly 
directly opposite to the way of the most efficient health care systems around the 
world. In other systems, most of the pricing leverage is on the side of the 
government payer, allowing the state to effectively hold down the price of health 
care.210 In the United States under the ACA, however, the state has too little 
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leverage in its attempts to ensure insurance companies participate in the 
markets211—to say nothing of its ability to impact the pricing of those plans.212  
B. SYMBIOTIC PRICING  
Called “arguably one of the most effective tools the White House has to 
hold down premium costs,” and the “Obamacare provision that terrifies 
insurers,”213 the Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) within the ACA was gloriously 
hailed as an indispensable policy tool that would ensure that “consumers [were] 
receiving a higher return on their premium dollars.”214 Writing in 2011 before 
NFIB, it was also asserted that it would “ultimately, lead to the death of large 
parts of the private, for-profit health insurance industry.”215 Housed within the 
sprawling ACA,216 the MLR was intended to “limit supposedly wasteful and 
self-serving spending by insurers.”217 Specifically, the MLR works by limiting 
“the portion of premium dollars health insurers may spend on administration, 
marketing, and profits,”218 and mandating that “insurers must spend at least 80 
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percent of their premium revenue on medical care and quality improvement.”219 
For large-group insurers, the companies must spend at least 85%.220 
The remaining 20% (or 15% for large-group insurers)221 of each dollar 
collected via premiums can be allocated to “pay overhead expenses, such as 
marketing, profits, salaries, administrative costs, and agent commissions.”222 
Insurance companies that miss the required MLR must provide rebates to its 
beneficiaries.223 Due to its importance, a battle front quickly opened between 
insurance companies and regulators over how to appropriately define what 
counted as a medical or quality improvement service.224 
There is no doubt that the MLR saved American beneficiaries a lot of 
money. According to the Obama White House, the MLR prevented consumers 
from paying what would have amounted to an estimated additional $9 billion in 
premiums from 2011 to 2013.225 Even after the markets were fully functioning, 
it has continued to save beneficiaries money. According to Kaiser, in 2015, a 
total of nearly 1.2 million beneficiaries received MLR rebates totaling $107.3 
million.226 The regulatory floor that the ACA’s MLR provision imposed 
undoubtedly improved the financial efficiency of health insurance.227  
But, while it limits what health insurers can charge, it does not limit overall 
price increases. Indeed, mandating a certain level of efficiency for health 
insurers and reducing the overall cost of American health care are two separate 
aims. The MLR, while noble in its goals and “relatively easy” to understand in 
terms of its vague cost control intentions,228 ensures that the premiums American 
beneficiaries pay are more tightly tied to the cost of their health care. But the 
MLR does nothing to hold down the cost of their health care at the outset.  
Worse, the MLR may not only be neutral on the cost control question, but, 
stunningly, may actually harm global cost control efforts, blunting the natural 
incentive of insurance companies to strenuously negotiate with providers and 
hospitals in efforts to hold down the costs of health care. Under an MLR, a health 
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insurance company—the only actor in the health care delivery system that is 
purportedly incentivized to hold down the cost of health care—actually hurts 
itself more by vigorously holding down price increases because its profits are 
limited to a percentage of premiums collected. Lower health care prices lead to 
smaller profits. No matter how you slice it, 20% of a smaller pie is a smaller 
number. 
Put another way, an insurance company that wishes to grow its profit—not 
the percentage of profit it is allowed to pocket in the marketplaces, but the gross 
amount of profit—is incentivized to raise its premiums. Because there is no limit 
on the amount premiums can increase on an annual basis, there is a limit on the 
percentage of profit an insurance company can pocket. There is a simple solution 
for the insurance company seeking to grow its profits: raise prices, or, at least 
avoid spirited negotiations with health systems and providers in which the 
insurance company seeks to limit cost growth in the system. In effect, then, the 
MLR blunts the most powerful cost control impulses of the insurance 
companies, whose officers, by the way, have fiduciary duties to maximize 
company profits for their shareholders.229 
There is a clear response to this concern: in the private marketplace, 
insurance companies that fail to hold down premium increases effectively will 
lose customers. And, like in any private marketplace, those insurance companies 
that can limit their year-over-year premium increases will be rewarded in the 
individual marketplace by growing market share. After all, no one wants to pay 
for a health insurance plan that inadequately negotiates with providers; as a 
result, those insurance plans that inflate prices (or allow their prices to grow) in 
an effort to increase their profits will be damaged when consumers flee their 
plans because of the cost of their premiums. 
But that response ignores three important details about the health insurance 
marketplace that all demonstrate that it is unlike any other typical market. 
Specifically, (1) the health insurance market is under-competitive; (2) the health 
insurance consumer is not price-sensitive; and (3) increasingly saturated health-
care provider markets have already flipped leverage in the provider-insurer 
relationship. Relying on the consumer to prevent the worst excesses of the ACA 
private exchange market is ineffective. 
Like an annual ritual, substantial hand wringing has occurred around the 
concern that whole counties will soon lack an ACA exchange insurer.230 Even 
though it has not yet happened,231 the number of counties with just one 
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4:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/health-care/2017/8/24/16199620/voxcare-no-counties-without-obamacare. 
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participating insurer has been striking.232 In fact, in 2018, a majority of counties 
in the individual marketplace (52% of all counties)—nonetheless representing 
where about 26% of enrollees live—had one participating insurer on the ACA 
marketplace.233 This percentage is lower than originally projected,234 but a 
marketplace with only one participating insurer is not a competitive 
marketplace. A sole competitive insurer can raise prices with impunity. Given 
anemic competition, any “profit-share penalty” for raising premiums—a typical 
deterrent for sellers in other marketplaces—is severely blunted. 
In addition to insurance companies’ failure to represent a typical seller’s 
market, beneficiaries shopping for an individual health insurance plan are not 
true consumers in any typical sense.235 Again, the majority of beneficiaries 
receive subsidies that cover the majority of their health insurance costs,236 
weakening their drive to be price-discriminating consumers. Whether or not 
beneficiaries have enough “skin in the game” is a topic that has garnered 
scholarly attention.237 However, notwithstanding the perfect calibration of 
consumer “pain,” any subsidy that helps the many beneficiaries purchasing plans 
on the ACA individual market lessens the pressure on beneficiaries to be 
naturally price-discriminating. A consumer who enjoys the fact that more than 
80% of one’s bill is being covered by the federal government cannot possibly 
mimic a true consumer. 
Finally, insurance companies that do not strenuously negotiate, while being 
more attractive to providers and hospitals, may also—as a byproduct of being 
weaker negotiators—actually make their products more attractive by offering 
larger networks to the beneficiaries who sign up for their plans. If the insurance 
company is less concerned about aggressively having to attract customers to 
purchase its plan while also being more dependent on premium assistance tax 
credits from the federal government, it is less worried about holding down its 
prices, which makes it more attractive to hospitals and doctors who wish to 
increase their prices. In this way, the MLR within the ACA may actually be 
incentivizing insurance companies to allow providers and hospitals to raise 
prices faster than they otherwise would. 
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C. POLITICAL AND REGULATORY DEGRADATION 
In an easy jump, financial pain, socioeconomic chafing, and unbridled 
resentment can very easily slide into political degradation. The truth is the ACA 
has not enjoyed clear public support since its implementation. This, among other 
characteristics, has been a particularly troublesome feature of a law that many 
policy experts thought would be popular.238 That it took a direct frontal assault 
in early 2017 to finally pull the law over 50 percent approval should be telling.239 
Unsurprisingly, polling on removing the individual mandate penalty was split 
nearly completely in half in early 2017.240 This, of course, has continued to place 
its long-term stability at risk, and has led Republicans to strive to repeal 
president Obama’s signature piece of legislation for the better part of a 
decade.241  
This resentment is not without political costs.242 Reporting after the 2016 
election, Sarah Kliff found that “[m]any expressed frustration that Obamacare 
plans cost way too much, that premiums and deductibles had spiraled out of 
control. And part of their anger was wrapped up in the idea that other people 
were getting even better, even cheaper benefits—and those other people did not 
deserve the help.”243  
The law is not threatened only by political degradation, but also regulatory 
degradation. The government’s decision to link the expansion in access to an 
expansion and reordering of the private insurance marketplace creates a 
regulatory conflict of interest. Because the government is both committed to 
expanding the number of individuals who have insurance and responsible for 
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regulating—and theoretically, penalizing—insurance plans that deviate from the 
strictures of the ACA’s rules, it may be the case that one interest inextricably 
conflicts with the other. For instance, if the government’s interest in adequately 
policing the individual exchange marketplace shrinks the number of plans for 
sale on those exchanges, it ultimately harms its goal in achieving universal 
coverage through supporting and protecting robust marketplaces. 
III.  TEN YEARS OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS  
Ten years after its original insights,244 behavioral economics has surely 
come to the law—even health law.245 A field credited to Cass Sunstein and 
Richard Thaler,246 behavior economics study has been described as “economics 
done with strong injections of good psychology.”247 The field’s “core insight” 
lays on the realization that “human beings do not always act in [their] own long-
term best interests,”248 and that individuals “have limited cognitive abilities and 
a great deal of trouble exercising self-control.”249 Further, people are 
“profoundly influenced by context, and often have little idea of what they will 
prefer next year or even tomorrow.”250 These insights encourage choice 
architects and policymakers to consider the construction of various “nudges,” 
which are intended to encourage decision-makers to make better “prosocial” 
decisions.251  
The contributions of Sunstein and Thaler are evidenced by their bestselling 
book,252 Nudge, published in 2008.253 These insights have been used to influence 
law and policy development, seeking to build structures that lead to better 
individual decision-making and, ultimately, better policy outcomes, without 
legal compulsion. As such, the field of behavioral economics has been an 
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important tool in recent discourse surrounding the future of legal regulation. One 
contribution of Sunstein and Thaler that has been particularly influential has 
been their work around libertarian paternalism.254  
Drawing on some well-established findings in behavioral economics and 
cognitive psychology, we emphasize the possibility that in some cases 
individuals make inferior decisions in terms of their own welfare—decisions 
that they would change if they had complete information, unlimited cognitive 
abilities, and no lack of self-control. . . . Libertarian paternalism is a 
relatively weak and nonintrusive type of paternalism, because choices are not 
blocked or fenced off. In its most cautious forms, libertarian paternalism 
imposes trivial costs on those who seek to depart from the planner’s preferred 
option. But the approach we recommend nonetheless counts as paternalistic, 
because private and public planners are not trying to track people’s 
anticipated choices, but are self-consciously attempting to move people in 
welfare-promoting directions.255  
Recent writing has suggested that individuals prefer such “nudges” that 
rely on “statistical information and factual disclosures” largely “on the 
assumption that they show greater respect for individual autonomy and dignity 
and promote individual agency” more than nudges that are not “educative and 
which target or benefit from automatic processing.”256 
Nonetheless, the insights made by Sunstein and Thaler have been imported 
into health law and policy, as “[p]eople often make decisions in health care that 
are not in their best interest.”257 Expanding horizons beyond traditional hard law 
tools, health policy and public health experts have increasingly explored and 
deployed softer incentives based on new understandings of human behavior.258 
These efforts may either reward actors who advance public aims, penalize those 
who fail to achieve them, or—more simply—seek to improve decision-making 
from independent actors. One of the upsides of these softer regulatory 
interventions is the avoidance of command and control mandates from the state. 
A. MODERN POLICY “NUDGES” IN HEALTH LAW 
Drawing on lessons in other areas of health law that have adopted more 
targeted interventions, the ACA’s individual marketplace could be more 
intentional about health care “nudges.”259 Indeed, as currently constructed, 
health insurance companies are not encouraged to think about the long-term 
impacts of rising premiums, nor are they incentivized to undertake cost-saving 
efforts that are directly contradictory to their profit goals. Recent examples of 
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the increasing deployment of tools from behavioral economics within health law 
and policy—soft pressures that encourage particularized decision-making, or 
push decision-makers to just be more deliberative—are illustrative. 
1. Consumers and Employees: Soft Efforts 
Soft efforts that seek to improve individual decision-making can be found 
prominently in the public health sphere. A legitimate primary policy goal of a 
state—a healthier populace—leads to policymaking that seeks to encourage 
citizens to make healthier decisions.260 But by employing science on decision-
making, the interventions can be constructed in a way that make the population 
more likely to choose the healthier option without deploying mandates. One of 
the chief challenges, of course, associated with employing these interventions is 
avoiding causing a backlash due to their coercive nature, something that has 
been common in health law and policy.261 Indeed, mandates engender 
opposition.262  
Constructed with the important goal of encouraging citizens or employers 
to make healthier decisions, recent examples of health interventions include 
restaurant calorie counts, employer wellness bonuses, and city soda taxes. While 
these interventions may have some of the hallmarks of a hard mandate, they do 
not interfere with the ultimate actor’s ability to make a decision. Instead, these 
interventions seek to change incentives for the decision-makers, pushing, or 
nudging, them to make decisions that result in better health outcomes, while also 
producing monetary savings for the employer or city. For sure, their overall 
effectiveness is not assured because they still are dependent upon the end user’s 
decision. 
In fact, their general effectiveness is still debated. Notably, how 
interventions are framed, whether as a gain or loss, have been shown to not make 
a difference in behavior.263 Nonetheless, it appears that imposing penalties for 
undesirable behavior—an example of which would be soda taxes—may be more 
effective than the information-ensuring calorie counts or voluntary employer 
wellness incentives. Each is summarized in turn below. 
Calorie Counts. In the spirit of providing more information to 
consumers,264 and required by the ACA for restaurants with twenty or more 
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locations,265 publishing menu calorie counts seeks to push consumers to make 
healthier choices in restaurants.266 But because they are voluntarily employed by 
consumers, and there are no immediately ascertainable impacts for relying on 
them or not in making decisions, their effectiveness may be limited. Past 
experiences have been illuminating. 
After New York City deployed the counts, customers “reported that they 
saw and used calorie counts more often than people did in restaurants without 
labels,” but, as the years wore on, “fewer and fewer people reported noticing 
them or considering them,” and eventually ignored them.267 Other studies have 
concluded that although individuals noticed the counts and they resulted in 
“increased nutrition information awareness,” it did not ultimately change 
ordering decisions.268 Another systematic review concluded that “over all, menu 
labeling did not produce any significant changes in what people ordered.”269 
Employer Wellness Programs. Employer wellness programs reward 
employees—typically financially—who adopt healthier behaviors and/or make 
healthier decisions.270 Reports on whether they are successful are also mixed.271 
Although it seems as though financial incentives would impact decision-making, 
one recent study concluded that employees’ behaviors do not improve, and 
employers do not achieve cost savings, as a result of such a program.272 
Nonetheless, another study “found 25 percent lower sick leave, health plan, 
workers’ compensation, and disability insurance costs among companies that 
had wellness programs.”273  
Still another study “found an average annual health care cost increase of 
1–2% for companies with wellness programs, compared to the 7% national 
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average.”274 Observational studies on such programs demonstrate that wellness 
programs can be plagued with limited value.275 Notwithstanding the 
effectiveness of the wellness programs, they are increasingly popular across the 
country.276 
Soda Taxes. Soda taxes have also proliferated across the United States, 
including a prominent and successful soda tax deployed by the city of 
Philadelphia.277 Upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2018,278 
Philadelphia’s soda taxes—which impose a 1.5 cent per ounce tax on sweetened 
beverages—have succeeded in shrinking soda consumption rates.279 Early 
studies have shown that “Philadelphians are about 40 percent less likely than 
residents of three nearby cities to have a soda every day.”280 In addition to 
positive health impacts, the tax funds a pre-kindergarten program in the city.281 
And it has enjoyed popular support: in late 2016, three months before the tax 
took effect, 54% of Philadelphia’s residents polled supported the tax, with 42% 
opposed.282 
But reports from Philadelphia have not been all positive. Critics have 
suggested that the city is not raising as much revenue as anticipated,283 as 
revenue from the program pulled in about $80 million for the city in its first 
year.284 In another example, Chicago repealed its soda tax after it generated 
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significant controversy.285 Further, the target of food taxes may be broadening. 
Other penalties that seek to limit consumption of unhealthy foods and 
environmental harm—like “meat taxes”—may be on the horizon.286  
2. Organizations and Physicians: Value Payments 
The Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), a voluntary incentive-
based reimbursement program, is a component part of the ACA.287 This program 
seeks to reward care administered that is reflective of high quality, highly 
efficient care.288 Most basically, “the MSSP enables provider organizations to 
share a percentage of the savings they achieve in delivering services to Medicare 
beneficiaries, provided they meet quality performance standards.”289 This is 
accomplished through pushing providers and entities into creating new 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), where the new organization is “held 
accountable for the quality, cost, and experience of care of an assigned Medicare 
fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiary population.”290 Coordinating care in this way 
is intended to push providers to be more cognizant of the cost of certain care 
delivery, while, at the same time, improving quality by “avoiding unnecessary 
duplication” and “preventing medical errors.”291 
These new payment structures flip the old incentives of fee-for-service 
medicine on their heads, enticing organizations to deliver care that is high-
quality and efficient.292 After all, if the ACO achieves quality and efficiency 
benchmarks, “the ACO will share in the savings it achieves for the Medicare 
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program.”293 This would reverse years of incentives that encourage providers to 
increase billing.294 
Early reports regarding their effectiveness were mixed.295 More recent 
reports raised the likelihood of prospective turbulence for the program, with 
many ACOs considering leaving the program,296 and proposed CMS changes to 
the ACO structure potentially on the horizon.297 Nonetheless, some of the 
changes may not ultimately impact ACO participation.298 
A larger goal of the program is its hope to “leverage[e] Medicare policy to 
transform health delivery and payment practices in the private sector.”299 
Mirroring the value-based movement, Medicare—through the MSSP—is 
seeking to incentivize hospitals to administer services that are more beneficial 
to both its beneficiaries and the fiscal health of the program itself.300 In this way, 
the structural frame has been constructed to push entities and providers to care 
more about efficiencies and quality metrics—something that previously, in the 
Medicare program, has been an underappreciated concern.301 
Value-based purchasing has also come to Medicare Part B.302 Under the 
Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), which was created under the 
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015,303 physicians who 
participate in Medicare Part B and who are not enrolled in an alternative 
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payment model (APM)304 are measured on four separate metrics—quality, 
resource use/cost, clinical practice improvement activities, and advancing care 
information.305 Participation is mandatory for providers who are not enrolled in 
an APM, with exceptions.306 Again, mirroring the MSSP, providers within MIPS 
are financially encouraged to be mindful of delivery efficiency, increasing 
reimbursement by providing high quality care at a lower cost.307 The resource 
use criterion directly measures a provider’s efficiency. Nonetheless, challenges 
to the MIPS program are likely forthcoming from the Trump administration.308 
IV.  COST-CONSCIOUS MARKET ARCHITECTURE  
In seeking to leave room for private market actors within the individual 
health insurance exchanges, the ACA adopted a model that is not unfamiliar to 
the history of American health law and policy: an unwavering commitment to 
the private market’s ability to provide health insurance, but an accompaniment 
of substantial government-imposed regulatory guardrails. The ACA 
supercharged this model in that it lured private insurance companies into a 
previously unprofitable market (made profitable by generous subsidies) while 
building up the regulatory scaffolding that surrounded it. It paid private 
insurance companies to participate while mandating that they sell insurance to 
citizens with health risks they would have never previously accepted. 
Participation remains voluntary. 
But by relying on the voluntary action of private entities—with markedly 
different goals than the government—to deliver health insurance to the market’s 
customers, the scheme failed to adequately take account of conflicts of interest 
that naturally occur within the market. With weak market-based pressures, and 
devoid of regulations that sufficiently incentivize the insurance companies to 
limit their premium increases, the federal government—and the market’s 
patient-beneficiaries—are simply along for the ride. This is the case, even 
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though fraud enforcement,309 as well as fiduciary regulation,310 could be brought 
to bear in an attempt to better neutralize these conflicts of interest.311  
In other realms of health law, policy interventions based on softer 
incentives have been deployed for employees, restaurant visitors, soda lovers, 
physicians who participate in Medicare Part B, and hospitals and clinics that 
form ACOs. In an effort to increase enrollment on the individual market, other 
creative ideas—those directed toward insurance beneficiaries—have also been 
suggested.312 Although a good idea from a risk-spreading perspective in that the 
increased enrollment causes premiums to drop for all beneficiaries, solutions 
directed toward beneficiaries’ enrollment decisions do not impact the price of 
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American health care in the way that an intervention targeted at insurance 
companies would. 
Nonetheless, the ACA’s subsidies could be restructured to operate on the 
beneficiaries in a more direct manner. As mentioned above, the ACA’s tax 
subsidies are keyed to one’s household income.313 This creates unnatural 
incentives for individuals who want to avoid pay raises, concerned about how 
that may impact their subsidy amount.314 And, as also mentioned above, the 
subsidy structure’s fragmented cliffs may prevent individuals from wanting to 
experience household income raises altogether.315 Mirroring recent public health 
interventions, this construction—leaving subsidies to be determined solely by 
household income, not by socially beneficial behavior—missed an opportunity 
to reward “good citizens,” which would have allowed individuals who make 
healthy choices to receive higher government subsidy amounts. The 
beneficiary’s agency—and their socially beneficial decisions—could be directly 
(and financially) rewarded. 
Other supplemental regulatory changes that hold down the cost of care for 
individual beneficiaries—albeit ones that may be less successful in affecting the 
baseline cost of care—could be employed. Drawing on scholarship examining 
the right amount of “skin in the game” to prevent the documented problem of 
moral hazard,316 perhaps additional new regulations could limit deductibles to a 
percentage of one’s income. This would alleviate the problem of individuals 
feeling as though their deductibles are so expensive that they cannot afford to 
even access health care—the same care their expensive insurance plans 
seemingly guarantee. 
But using the same theoretical mechanisms, there is no reason to keep 
similar interventions from being unleashed in the ACA marketplace beyond 
beneficiaries, but also to work on insurance companies as well. Insurance 
companies are the actors in the most powerful position to impact the cost of 
insurance, largely because of the extensive leverage they enjoy. What is striking 
is the absence of well-calibrated soft incentives—that are responsibly geared to 
impacting the behavior of insurance companies on the ACA’s exchanges—that 
are a missed opportunity to shape behavior.  
Indeed, the subsidy structure could have been wholly restructured in a way 
to incentivize and nudge insurance companies themselves—the actors that are 
seeking year-over-year premium hikes—to neutralize some of the worst 
conflicts of interest on the market. Relying on behavioral economics literature, 
the subsidies could have been calibrated to seek to influence the behavior of 
insurance companies that would have made the decision to raise premiums 
costlier for the insurance companies themselves. This would have the upside of 
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not only making health insurance more affordable but would also sharpen an 
incentive that—in the current ACA market—is too dull: this would pressure 
insurance companies to seek additional discounts from health care providers, 
including both hospitals and physicians. 
Instead of just paying based on a beneficiary’s household income, the 
federal government could have structured the subsidies in a way that encouraged 
and incentivized insurance companies to set prices lower. For example, the 
federal government could have imposed a “tiered” subsidy plan with its subsidy 
payments, so as to reward efficient insurance companies by paying larger 
subsidies to those who hold down premium increases year over year. This could 
be accomplished through either paying direct subsidies to the most efficient 
insurance companies, or by using the beneficiaries as indirect conduits. This 
structure would seek to steer beneficiaries—through rewards with tax 
subsidies—toward more efficient and cost-conscious insurance companies.  
To accomplish this, beneficiaries who select a particular plan—one that 
was quite efficiently priced—could be rewarded with higher subsidies. If a 
consumer is paid more money for choosing a more cost-conscious plan, more 
consumers would be pushed to purchase the plans sold by the cost-conscious 
insurance company. As a result, persistently expensive insurance plans may face 
the cold reality of shrinking market share.  
Assuming the subsidy gain was sufficient, this arrangement would push 
insurance companies that sell plans on the individual marketplace to spend more 
of their focus on holding down annual premium amounts, providing a powerful 
counterweight to the pressure they feel to continue to raise premiums. The key 
function of this new arrangement would be to encourage insurance companies 
to think harder when setting premium amounts for the marketplace’s following 
year. This would also push insurance companies to drive aggressive negotiations 
with providers and hospitals, providing another, more potent tool to push the 
“sellers” of American health care to lower their prices on the front end. 
As an alternative to the subsidy structure, the payments could instead be 
structured as a tax—similar to the soda taxes deployed in Philadelphia—that 
would penalize insurance companies that seek the highest percentage of 
premium increases. Or they could be structured like an incentive payment that 
mirrors the MSSP—insurance companies that achieve cost savings, or at least 
limit health care premiums the most, could be rewarded with higher subsidy 
payments from the federal government (or indirectly, through subsidies 
originally given to beneficiaries). However structured, this new mechanism 
would evince a clear policy choice for those insurance plans that operate in a 
leaner way.  
A secondary goal would surely follow. Pressed to limit premium increases 
so as to increase subsidy amounts, insurance companies would approach 
network negotiations with hospitals and physicians in a more powerful position. 
Currently blunted from fighting health care price increases too strongly by the 
MLR and other market failures, the new subsidy architecture would make the 
304 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:261 
insurance company that saves its beneficiaries more money, more profitable. 
Like physicians participating in Medicare’s Shared Savings Program, the federal 
government would be sharing savings with insurance companies on the 
exchange, literally paying carriers to operate with cost efficiency at front of 
mind. 
Whatever policy solution is ultimately furthered, market subsidies could be 
creatively restructured in a way that more clearly address the worst inefficiencies 
of the individual marketplaces that have struggled to survive. Employing 
important lessons from behavioral economics—meant to encourage these actors 
on the ACA exchanges into making more pro-social business decisions—could 
provide a guiding platform for powerful changes to the marketplaces. The 
counterweight could effectively insulate more Americans from the worst costs 
of American health care. 
Although the thrust of this proposal—to build-in and instantiate societally-
beneficial price pressures in the insurance markets—contemplates the injection 
of corrective incentives, there are limits of the proposal that are worth 
mentioning. The biggest challenge to the proposal is that it would have to be 
implemented by states or the federal government in the insurance marketplaces 
they run.317 The likelihood of the states and federal government—given the 
political volatility of the ACA markets and the inner-workings of the law—
seems relatively low at this point. State actors have been hesitant to touch the 
ACA, largely for reasons related to politics. Nonetheless, more states seem 
interested in stepping up to address some of the worst of the market’s 
inefficiencies, often providing a corrective to federal government policies that 
have damaged the health of the private ACA marketplaces.318 
But, assuming implementation, the other major challenge revolves around 
adequately calibrating the shared savings subsidies. Should the subsidies be too 
meager, they would be unlikely to sufficiently impact insurance companies’ 
behavior. Should the subsidies be too great, insurance companies may cut too 
many health care services from their required coverages. To the extent that ACA 
regulations on essential health benefits are enforced, this would help to prevent 
this problem.319 Still, cost-cutting could result in more narrow networks for 
beneficiaries, frustrating their efforts to see a specialist or specific provider. A 
key consideration here would be to ensure the subsidies are neither too cold nor 
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too hot—a lesson learned through trial and error during an important 
implementation period. 
A final challenge to successful implementation would be participation. It 
is not hard to imagine a scenario in which no insurance company elects to restrict 
its costs to achieve subsidies. For instance, if no insurance company decides to 
be impacted by the subsidy arrangement—recognizing such an arrangement is 
strictly voluntary—there is nothing that would require them to enroll in such a 
program. Nonetheless, the profit pressure—as well as pressure from its 
shareholders to generate increasing profits—may push companies into 
participating in a shared savings program.  
CONCLUSION 
That the ACA is both still substantially intact and remains under existential 
threat illustrates both its striking resiliency and the proximity of peril. Its 
strengths and weaknesses track a dichotomous history within American health 
care. Indeed, for generations, Americans have been skeptical of government 
involvement, but uncomfortable with relying on the cold reality of the market. 
Besides distorting and constricting the development of American health care law 
and policy, these conflicting beliefs have resulted in both a bloated and under-
regulated non-system, one that continues—even after the ACA—to prove its 
unworkability for millions of Americans. Citizens now have access to insurance, 
but the cost of care remains an insufficiently addressed challenge. 
Seen by some as a turn away from the chaotic decades that proceeded it, 
the ACA did not sufficiently account for America’s cost crisis. Its individual 
marketplace—hampered by a lack of competition—continues to struggle. But 
new ideas from behavioral economics, deployed in other areas within health law 
itself, could be brought to bear in an effort to bring down the cost of insurance, 
providing a powerful counterweight to the conflicts of interest that continue to 
incentivize insurance companies to operate at cross-purposes with a desire to 
bring down the costs within the system. These changes could put the ACA on 
more secure political footing and, most importantly, may prove an effective tool 
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